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ABSTRACT
The development of global intellectual property rights ("IPRs") can lead to complex
issues regarding conformity with international standards of IP protection and
enforcement. Although each country willing to become a WTO signatory is tasked
with the development of such a regime, each country's domestic affairs and economic
survival competes with the burden of adhering to those international standards. This
struggle provides the potential for many countries to confuse the boundaries of
protection and create a fog of marginal infringement. In China, this fog is heavier
because of local protectionism and judicial disincentives to enforce IPRs.
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CHINA'S STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN ECONOMIC VIABILITY WHILE
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
RANDAL S. ALEXANDER*
"America has a profound stake in what happens in China and how
China relates to the rest of the world. That's why, for 30 years, every
President, without regard to party, has worked for a China that
contributes to the stability of Asia, that is open to the world, that
upholds the rule of law at home and abroad."
-Former President Clinton, on U.S.-China trade relations1

INTRODUCTION
One of the most contentious issues before the World Trade Organization
("WTO") is the enforcement of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (the "TRIPs Agreement") upon WTO members that are
developing countries.
Developing countries, such as China struggle with the
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement standards while maintaining their domestic
agendas.
This struggle leads many developing countries to blur the lines of
protection and therefore create a fog that obscures effective enforcement of
intellectual property rights ("IPRs") allowing the countries to reap the rewards of
both membership in the WTO and non-compliance with TRIPs. The United States,
along with other developed countries, argues that although developing countries are
eager to profit from new technology, they are slow to implement measures to prevent
infringement and uphold enforcement of foreign IPRs.
China, a rapidly growing developing country, invites much of the IP realm's
attention because of China's deficient enforcement of WTO standards regarding
IPRs.2 In response to China's increased importance in the global economy, this
comment provides a case study of China as a developing country seeking to develop
and bolster its IP regime.
As a backdrop for the discussion, Part I outlines the chronological development
of global IPRs through the establishment of the WTO and the codification of TRIPs.
Part I also delineates the policies and standards set forth in the TRIPs agreement.
Part II discusses the economics of creating an IP regime. Next, Part III and Part IV
* J.D. Candidate I.P., June 2006, The John Marshall Law School. B.S. Biology, Midwestern
State University, Wichita Falls, Texas. I would like to thank my family for their continual support
and encouragement, especially my brother, Ryan Alexander, whose undying desire to see me
challenge myself and attain my goals has inspired me beyond all recognition. In addition, I am
grateful for the guidance of my editor, Dan M. Lechleiter, whose skill and motivation are beyond
compare, and the rest of the RIPL editorial staff for their hard work.
I Bill Clinton, Former U.S. President, Remarks of the President on China at the Paul H. Nitze
School
of
Advanced
International
Studies,
(Mar,
08,
2000),
http://www.usembassy.it/file2000
03/alia/a0030819.htm
(last
visited
Aug.
1,
2005).
2
See, e.g., Scott J. Palmer, An Identity Crisis: Regime Legitimacy and the Politics of
IntellectualPropertyRights in China, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 449, 465-66 (2001).
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discuss China's creation of an IP regime along with its entrance into the
international IP arena and the United States's involvement in influencing China's IP
laws. Lastly, Part V analyzes and proposes legal reforms to enable China to solve the
judicial and administrative problems that inhibit China's enforcement of IPRs.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ARENA

The foundation of IP rights in the international arena dates back over a
century to the Paris3 and Berne 4 Conventions, which established minimum standards
of protection for IP among the member countries.
Subsequently, the global
marketplace
experienced
rapid industrialization
and vast
technological
advancements that negatively affected the supervision of those IPRs in the
developing global economy. 5 In the mid-twentieth century, the United Nations
established the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") to supervise the
standards of the Paris and Berne Conventions. 6 WIPO's fundamental focus was
sustaining the viability of international IPRs by providing its member states with
both a forum for the negotiation of international agreements and guidance within the
7
parameters of existing treaties.
However, the protection of IPRs under WIPO remained fragmented and
unenforceable. 8 As a result, member states exploited various means of circumventing
WIPO's enforcement measures. 9 The lack of effective protection eventually compelled
the WIPO member states to seek additional avenues of enforcement to strengthen
measures protecting IPRs, such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
3 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised
at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
4 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last
revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as amended) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
See Jose Felgueroso, Trips and the Dispute Settlement Understanding:The First Six Years,
30 AIPLA Q.J. 165, 169 (2002). The deficiencies caused by such advancement manifested as a lack
of international harmonization, disparate national treatment and an inadequate system of IPR
enforcement. Id.
6World Intellectual Property Organization, General Information, http://www.wipo.int/aboutwipo/en/gib.htm (last visited July 26, 2005).
7 Id. Through its 180 member states, WIPO seeks to:
harmonize national intellectual property legislation and procedures, provide
services for international applications for industrial property rights, exchange
intellectual property information, provide legal and technical assistance to
developing and other countries, facilitate the resolution of private intellectual
property disputes, and marshal information technology as a tool for storing,
accessing, and using valuable intellectual property information.
Id.
8 See Felgueroso, supra note 5, at 171. Although WIPO is highly regarded for its expertise in
the field of intellectual property, its enforcement mechanisms lack strength because the enforcement
of international agreements is left up to the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). Id. at 170.
Offending countries were able to circumvent ICJ enforcement with little consequence by declining
the ICJ's jurisdiction and blocking or ignoring the ICJ's rulings. Matthew V. Pietsch, International
Copyright Infringement and the Internet."An Analysis of the Existing Means of Enforcement, 24
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 273, 304 (2002).
9 See Felgueroso, supra note 5, at 171.
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("GATT").10 GATT became a focal point for developed countries to introduce IPR
protection into the realm of international trade.11 During the 1994 Uruguay Round
of negotiations for GATT, the establishment of the WT0 12 and the TRIPs Agreement
combined IPRs with international trade. 13 The general responsibility assigned to the
WTO was to provide a forum for further negotiations that would enhance the
applicability of the newly created TRIPs Agreement to the evolving area of IP
14
protection within the international arena.
The TRIPs Agreement-as expressed in Article 7-is premised upon the idea
that promoting innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology will
further global economic development.1 5 In order to safeguard the welfare of the
member countries, the rights and obligations of the TRIPs Agreement take into
consideration the necessity to balance the protection of individual members' IPRs
16
with the realities of socioeconomic and technological development faced by each.

10Id.

See generallyGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-li, 55

U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
11Michael P. Ryan et al., From International Trade to International Economic Law:
International Governmental Organization Knowledge Management for Multilateral Trade
Lawmaking, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1347, 1370-73 (2000) (discussing the development of GATT's
purposes from facilitating multilateral trade cooperation through tariff-reduction negotiations to
reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade, and ultimately including trade-related economic policy
issues of IP). The rationale of linking IPRs and free trade under GATT would ultimately require
signatories to uphold a minimum standard of intellectual property protection. Keith Ferguson,
PPJC.Economic Jutiee/Globalization -The World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Multilateral
Trade
Agreements
(GATT
GATS
TRIPS,
TRIMS,
etc.),
http://www.peaceand
justice.org/issues/econjustice/gl wto.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
12 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
155, 33 I.L.M. [hereinafter WTO]. The purpose of the WTO is to implement and enforce global rules
of trade (including the oversight of IPR protection) between the member countries in an effort
reduce
trade
friction.
World
Trade
Organization,
The
WTO
in
Brief,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/inbrief e/inbrOO e.htm#content (last visited Oct 4,
2004). The WTO also provides a dispute settlement process aimed towards enforcing conformity of
the member countries. Id.
The disputes that arise are resolved within a dispute-settlement system set forth in the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU'). See
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTSRESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]; see also
Felgueroso, supra note 5, at 178.
Under the DSU, member countries who receive decisions against an offending fellow member
may impose trade sanctions if the offending member does not comply with the DSU decision.
Felgueroso, supra note 5, at 170-80 (discussing the actions available to parties involved in the DSU
hearing).
1 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs],
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf (providing for the common protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights, such as copyrights, trademarks and patents, and making
rules intended to limit the international trade in counterfeit goods).
14
Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS. The Emerging World View, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 413 (1996).
15TRIPs, supra note 13, art. 7.
16Id.arts. 7, 8.
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However, for purposes of this article, the TRIPs Agreement most notably
established that each member of the WTO is required to adapt its domestic IP laws
in accordance with a minimal standard of protection,17 which includes providing
domestic rules of enforcement and remedial measures to protect the rights of those
18
who hold IPRs.

II.

THE ECONOMICS OF CONFORMING TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION

The requirements of the TRIPs Agreement create a point of contention when
viewed in terms of a country's economic development. The level of a country's
industrial development often determines its economic power within the global
economy.19 The levels of industrialization are developed, newly developed, and
developing. 20 Throughout this spectrum of industrialization, different rationales
21
have been presented regarding whether IPRs should be given more or less strength.

A. Developed Countries

17See id. arts. 2(1), 9(1) (reflecting the substantive obligations of the main WIPO Conventions:
the Paris and Berne Conventions).
Member countries may adjust their domestic IPRs and
regulatory regimes "to accommodate local constraints as long as the general provisions of TRIPs are
adhered to." Sahar Aziz, Linking Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries with
Research and Development, Technology Transfer, and F+oreirnDirect Investment Policy: A Case
Study of Egypt's PharmaceuticalIndustry, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 12 (2003) (noting a
divergence from complete harmonization of IPRs on an international level).
18TRIPs, supra note 13, arts. 41-61 (requiring members to provide administrative, civil and
criminal procedures, and remedies for the enforcement of intellectual property rights).
19See Jean R. Homere, Intellectual Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the Economic
Development of Least Developed Countries,27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 277, 277 n.2 (2004).
According to Hugh Hansen's categorizations, countries of the world may be divided
into three groups in relation to their "production and consumption of intellectual
property products." First, there are the developed countries, which are net sellers
and exporters of intellectual property. They want to obtain increased value for
their exported technology, while seeking to secure worldwide protection. Second,
there are the newly developed countries with the resources and industries to
become net sellers and exporters. They seek broad worldwide protection in addition
to increased domestic protection as an incentive for local industry to develop
intellectual property and to compete better at home and abroad. Finally, there are
the developing countries and the least developed countries, which are the net users
and importers of intellectual property.
Id. It could be argued that such economic growth is chiefly a result of technology transfer and
development generated by IPR protection. Tara K. Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of
Information in a GlobalEconomy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 327, 332 (1993-1994).
20 Homere, supra note 19, at 277 n.2. The WTO allows countries to determine their own level of
industrialization relevant to their designation as a "developing" or "developed" country. World Trade
Organization,
Who
are
the
developing
countries
in
the
WTO?,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel e/dlwho e.htm (last visited July 26, 2005).
21 Giunta & Shang, supranote 19, at 330.
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Industrialized countries, in general, rely upon the development and transfer of
technology as a source of income. 22 Naturally, it is understandable that these
countries would have a greater interest in the protection of their IPRs.23 The
rationale for such protection stems from the economic loss that flows from the piracy
of such technology and the resulting absence of incentive to develop new
technologies. 24 Moreover, the absence of such an incentive could directly affect these
countries' competition in the global market and ultimately result in a plethora of idle
domestic economies. 25 One could conceive that such events would create a ripple
effect that would not only affect industrialized countries, but also those countries
26
whose development depends upon the advancement of the industrialized countries.
The TRIPs Agreement created of a minimum standard of IP protection may
seem politically self-serving to the developed countries that encouraged its
ratification; however, with stronger IP protection, developed countries will be less
reluctant to commit resources to foreign direct investment in undeveloped
countries. 27 Consequently, in order to ensure a continued flow of foreign investment,
it is beneficial for developing countries to support a "business environment friendly to
28
the needs of wealthy, western multinationals."

22Id. at 332.
23 Id.
24 Jd.

25Id,
26

See Aziz, supra note 17, at 5.

27 Id.

at 7. Foreign direct investment ("FD") refers to:
the purchase of a controlling interest in existing operations and businesses
(known as mergers and acquisitions). Multinational firms seeking to tap natural
resources, access lucrative or emerging markets, and keep production costs down
by accessing low-wage labour pools in developing countries are FDI investors.
Classic examples of FDI include American banks taking over Korean ones or
Canadian mining companies building mines in Brazil.
Currency Transaction Tax, Glossary of Financial Terms, http://www.currencytax.org/glossary.php
(last visited July 26, 2005). The free flow of capital across a country's borders has several
advantages to the investing country:
First, international flows of capital reduce the risk faced by owners of capital
by allowing them to diversify their lending and investment. Second, the global
integration of capital markets can contribute to the spread of best practices in
corporate governance, accounting rules, and legal traditions. Third, the global
mobility of capital limits the ability of governments to pursue bad policies.
Prakash Loungani and Assaf Razin, How Beneficial is Foreign Direct Investment for Developing
Countries?, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2O01/06/loungani.htm (last visited July 26,
2005). FDI also provides the host country with benefits:
(1) FDI allows the transfer of technology-particularly in the form of new
varieties of capital inputs-that cannot be achieved through financial investments
or trade in goods and services. FDI can also promote competition in the domestic
input market.
(2) Recipients of FDI often gain employee training in the course of operating
the new businesses, which contributes to human capital development in the host
country.
(3) Profits generated by FDI contribute to corporate tax revenues in the host
country.

Id.
28 Aziz,

supra note 17, at 7.
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B. Developing Countries
Developing countries, aspiring to become signatories to the WTO and conform to
the TRIPs agreement, face the difficult obstacle of establishing a sufficient domestic
IP regime. 29 These countries, in furtherance of their economic advancement in the
30
global economy, rely upon the more developed countries for technology imports.
This creates a concern that developed countries will utilize their advantage in the
marketplace and increase the prices of their goods.3 1 As a result, this could lead to a
trade deficit for developing countries and cause an overall decrease in a developing
country's ability to negotiate favorable terms of trade. 32 Wealthier countries might
abuse their competitive edge by fixing prices through cooperation with their
horizontal competitors.3 3 Thus, a dilemma emerges: newly developing countries are
reluctant to freely accept the industrialized world's assurances that it will act in an
appropriate manner to help sustain the development of those countries when it is
reasonably foreseeable that the industrialized countries can increase their economic
power by simply manipulating the flow of technology transfer to best benefit
themselves.

I1. FOUNDATION OF IPRs IN CHINA
Paradoxically, China has recognized the concept of one's legal right to buy, sell
or trade personal property as a commodity, 34 yet has had "no ideological reason to
enforce IPRs." 35 Throughout much of the twentieth century, no rights were accorded
to intellectual endeavors because of Imperial China's opposition to private
appropriation of ideas.3 6
The government believed that any such private
29

Marney L. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Regulatory Cooperation in InternationalAffairs: A
Review of the Global IntellectualPropertyRegime, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 277, 294-95 (2001).
The fact that many countries either were not signatories to the Paris or Berne Conventions, or were
signatories to one convention but not the other, left these countries lacking in IP protective
measures. Id.
30 See Aziz, supra note 17, at 9.
'1See id.
32 See id.
33 See id.
'3 Andrew
Evans, Taming the Counterfeit Dragon: The WTO, TRIPS and Chinese
Amendments to IntellectualPropertyLaws, 31 GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 587, 588 (2003).
3,Robert B. Frost, Jr., IntellectualPropertyRights Disputes in the 1990s Between the People's
Republic of China and the United States, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 119, 122 (1995) (noting the
paradox of granting an individual exclusive rights under China's socialist regime).
36Evans, supra note 34, at 588-89. This belief that the good of the whole outweighs individual
reward stems from Confucian principles that dominated Chinese culture from about 100 B.C. until
1911 A.D. Id. at 589. After the Maoists came into power in China, they reiterated the need for focus
on the good of the society over the development of an individual, thus allowing the traditional
practice of copying so that all could have access to creative works. Id.; see also Lewei Wang, The
CurrentEconomic andLegalProblemsBehind China'sPatentLaw, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 4
(1998). Article 23 of the Regulation on Awards for inventions states: "all inventions are the property
of the state, and no one or unit may claim monopoly over them. All units throughout the country ...
may make use of the inventions essential to them." Evans, supra note 34, at 589. Because of
China's principle of socialist economic development, the concept of protecting JPRs did not reach
fruition until China realized the importance of attracting foreign investors. Id. at 590.
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appropriation restricted the government's control of access to that idea. 37 However,
by the mid-1970s, Chinese leaders attributed the slow development of the economy to
38
the suppression of IPRs and soon turned towards a policy of IPR modernization.
These changes towards IPR protection reflected China's move from a centralized
isolationist economy toward a more market-based "open-door" economy. 39 For
example, in 1979, the United States and China entered into the Agreement of Trade
Relations (the "1979 Trade Agreement"),40 which indicated China's eagerness to open
its borders to international trade, recognize IPRs and undertake the effort to make
its markets more appealing to Western countries by explicitly mentioning the
41

importance of IPRs.
Since the signing of the 1979 Trade Agreement, China has been committed to
further developing its IP laws in order to improve its protection of IPRs. 42 In the
international realm, China acceded into most of the agreements for the protection of
IP: in 1980, China joined WIPO; 43 in 1985, China joined the Paris Convention; 44
seven years later, China joined the Berne Convention; and in 1993, China joined the
Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms. 45 Most significantly, in 2001, China
became a member of the WTO and a signatory to the TRIPs Agreement. 46 On the
domestic front, China promulgated several IP laws to solidify their IP regime: the
Trademark Law in 1982, the Patent Law in 1984, the Copyright Law in 1990, the
4
Software Protection Act in 1991 and the Unfair Competition Law in 1993. 7
'37Id.
38 Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracyof IntellectualPropertyin China and the FormerSoviet Union and
its Effects Upon International Trade: A Comparison, 46 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1998). This
modernization came at the end of a series of movements bent on restricting IPRs. Id. at 12. The
Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957 and the Great Leap Forward of 1958-60 repressed the existing
intellectual property laws that created material incentives for invention, creation and commercial
activity. Id. Then, in 1966, the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution placed further restrictions
upon the intellectual property laws. Id. Such restrictions ultimately caused inventors to withhold
the acknowledgement of their participation in such activities. Id.
'39Evans, supranote 34, at 590.
40See Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the People's
Republic of China, Jul. 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4651 [hereinafter 1979 Trade Agreement].
41See id. art. 6(1). "Contracting parties in their trade relations recognize the importance of
effective protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights." Id.; see also Evans, supra note 34, at
590 (noting China's willingness to adopt Western provisions containing concepts for the protection of
IPRs).
42Chengfei Ding, The Protection from New Plant Varieties of American Businesses in China
after China Enters the WTO, 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 333, 338 (2001) (noting that China "actively
participa[tes] in international cooperation programs in order to meet the international standards of
intellectual property protection").
43

Id.

4 Id.
45 Assafa Endeshaw, A CriticalAssessment of the US -ChinaConflict on IntellectualProperty,
6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 295, 312-13 (1996).
46 Wang Jun, Patent Law in China." Two Decades Later http://www.bjreview.com.cn/
200410/Business-200410(B).htm (last visited July 26, 2005) (underscoring the accession to the
agreements as a considerable feat towards China's efforts to bring confidence in their patent
system).
47 Graham J. Chynoweth, Reality Bites: How the Biting Reality of Piracyin China is Working
to Strengthen Its Copyright Laws, 2003 DuKE L. AND TECH. REV. 3, 5-6 (2003),
http://www.law.duke.edu/ journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2003DLTROO03.pdf.
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U.S. "INVOLVEMENT" IN STRENGTHENING CHINESE IPR ENFORCEMENT

Despite the legislative actions of China to improve their IPR regime, the
opportunity for rampant infringement, both domestically and abroad, remains. As of
2003, eighty percent of counterfeit goods in China were imitations of Chinese
brands. 48 As a result, the retailers of these products have no choice but to increase
prices to make a profit, depriving ordinary citizens of the ability to purchase quality
49
products at affordable prices.
Since accession to the WTO, China has been under strict scrutiny from domestic
and international law enforcement agencies, as well as private entities that attempt
to mirror law enforcement agencies' efforts to police counterfeiting. 50 Upon China's
bolstering of its IPRs protection in the 1990s, China "experienced a ten-fold increase
in foreign direct investments from 1990-95, receiving nearly $36 billion in 1995."51
However rather than greater scrutiny, simple global economics fueled this increase
because, on the international scale, China is a giant in the consumer market, having
a population of approximately 1.3 billon people. 52 Access to an economy of this size
provides an invaluable opportunity for foreign companies to acquire more resources
as well influence, through distribution, the surrounding economies of other Asian
countries. However, as the epidemic of IPR infringement in China continues, one
could conceive why global industries are hesitant to invest more in China. 53 This
infringement threatens China's technological advancement, and potentially impedes
China's ability to "assum[e] a more influential role in world trade and
54
manufacturing."
In response to China's inability to curb the excessive amount of counterfeiting
and piracy occurring within its boarders, the U.S. has taken actions to protect its own
IPRs. 55 In the past, the United States threatened China with sanctions through the
USTR Special 301 Action. 56 For example, on three separate occasions between 1992
48

Evans, supranote 34, at 596.

49 Id.

50Yahong Li, The Wolf Has Come: Are China's IntellectualProperty Industries Preparedfor
the WTO, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 77, 81 (2002) (noting that U.S. film companies
established offices in China to monitor the pirating of U.S. films, as well as other
infringing activities).
51Homere, supra note 19, at 286-87 (explaining how the adoption of the TRIPs agreement has
benefited lesser developed countries through foreign direct investment and technology transfer
where those countries have taken a progressive role in strengthening IPRs); see also Endeshaw,
supra note 45, at 318 (stating that although the United States protests the IP piracy in China, the
United States values the potential of the Chinese market too much to not to deal with China).
52 Chynoweth, supra note 47, at 2 (noting that access to such a large market has led the
international corporations to assist eagerly in bringing China up to speed).
5: Li, supra note 50, at 81 (2002). "China has been named the worst country in the world for
copyright infringement and trademark violations, costing .. .[-]just about anyone with a product
for sale-billions of dollars a year." Id. at 91.
, Evans, supranote 34, at 596.
55 Jd.
56See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06 (1988). In the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, the United States introduced a mechanism of identifying and dealing with
countries that lacked adequate and effective protection of IP rights and unfairly denied
market access to United States products: Special 301. Id. This Act listed the United
States's principal negotiating objectives regarding IP: to seek the enactment and
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and 1996, the United States threatened economic sanctions against China. 57 In
efforts to persuade the United States not enforce those sanctions, China signed
agreements promising to enact further measures to ensure the enforcement of its
58
existing IP laws.
Although these efforts show China's willingness to adapt its IP laws, the
sentiment of the United States is that such adaptations fall short of effective
enforcement. 59 Many in China, however, believe that the United State's demands for
eradicating piracy are irrational. 60 One objection stated that the "United States
demands encroached on [China's] sovereignty and that, as a developing country,
[China] could not handle large-scale stamping out of piracy." 61 Regardless of China's
deficient enforcement, the U.S. should remain involved to help China remedy some of
the problems related to their inadequate IP enforcement.

V. PROBLEMS WITHIN THE CHINESE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE

A country's development of domestic IPRs can lead to complex issues when it
conforms with the international standards of IP protection and enforcement.
Although each country willing to become a WTO signatory is tasked with the
development of such a regime, each country's domestic affairs and economic survival
enforcement, by foreign countries, of law which would recognize and adequately protect
IP and provide protection against unfair competition. See id. at § 2411; see also Evans,
supra note 34, at 597-98 (noting "the USTR's allowance of unilateral action against
any trading partner not meeting its obligations under the agreement").
57 Evans, supra note 34, at 597.
In 1992, the U.S. accused China of inadequately
protecting IPRs and the U.S. threatened sanctions. Id. In 1995, sanctions were almost enforced for
China's lack of enforcement of copyright protection. Id. Lastly, in 1996, the U.S. threatened, once
again, a multi-billion dollar penalty unless the Chinese government took action to quash the
production of American goods within its borders. Id.
5S Id.
In 1992 China signed the Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") which required
China to adopt the terms of the Berne Convention and the Convention for the Protection of
Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms. Id. The socalled 1995 Accord consisted of an Agreement Letter from the Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation and an Action Plan that consisted of four new mechanisms for combating
piracy. Idat 598. The new mechanisms consisted of:
(1) [An] intra-agency Intellectual Working Conferences and task
forces to investigate and handle copyright infringement cases;
(2) Identifying infringing regions and implementing six-month
special enforcement periods that would intensify efforts to apprehend
infringers;
(3) Implementing Source Identification Codes, a new licensing and
ownership verification system designed to help identify pirated goods,
namely domestically produced software; and
(4) Implementing new customs procedures to prevent the influx of
counterfeit goods into the stream of commerce.
Id. at 598.
59 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2004 Report to Congress on
China's
WTO
Compliance
Special
301
Report
§
306,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/Reports-Publications/2004/asset-uploadfile2816986.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
60Endeshaw, supra note 45, at 320.
31Id.
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competes with the burden of adhering to those international standards. This
struggle provides the potential for many countries to confuse the boundaries of
protection and accidentally create a fog of marginal infringement.
As China became more involved in creating an IPR regime, conforming with the
TRIPs Agreement presented several challenges. 62
These challenges included
upholding the minimum requirements, overcoming its weak bargaining position in
the creation of IP policies within the WTO, and dealing with competition from foreign
63
counterparts.
During the tumultuous development of China's IP regime, China seemingly has
faced many difficulties in offering IPR owners a broad protection and enforcement of
their rights. Once China opened the proverbial door, its cheap labor market and
fledgling IP system caused counterfeiters to flock to China in an attempt to take
advantage of the system's many vulnerabilities.6 4 As such, the implementation of an
IP system in China progressed sluggishly, primarily due to various administrative
66
difficulties 65 and impediments to judicial enforcement.

A. Local Protectionism
The decentralization process of the Chinese political system shifted power from
the central government to the local governments.6 7 Powerful local governments
created a problem of local protectionism. 68 Local protectionism is the result of a local
government creating a self-reliant economic "kingdom" 69 that tends to seek the
70
protection of traditional technology while limiting competition.
These local governments have proven uncooperative in China's overall effort to
protect and enforce IPRs because local governments often are not interested in
technology innovation. The enforcement of foreign IPRs without an immediate

62

Li, supranote 50, at 81.

(3

Id.

Evans, supra note 34, at 590.
at 590-91. Administrative problems arose from decentralization-the creation of
regional governments-within China. Id. The money to be made from counterfeiting spawned
corruption that penetrated to the upper echelon of the regional governments. Id. The same regional
governments were in control of funding the enforcement of IP law. It was more lucrative for officials
to turn a blind eye to the rampant piracy. Id. Even when proceedings were commenced against an
infringer, the multiple localities created a hardship for the IPR owner to receive uniform protection
because of the differences in the local procedures. Id.
( Id. at 592. Adjudication of an IPR in China under the decentralized system was ineffective
mainly due to a pseudo-sense of partiality and the lack of enforcement. d. Judges in each region
were faced with the convictions of the corrupt administrators (or were at least subject to their
influence if they wanted to stay politically viable). Id. In addition, the Chinese legal system
suffered from a lack of attorneys who were qualified to litigate national and international IP laws.
Id. Even if an IPR owner was able to get a friendly verdict without complication, the courts had
limited ability to enforce the court decrees. Id.
(7 Ding, supra note 42, at 347.
(38 See Wang, supra note 46, at 35-36.
( Id. at 35. Conflicts of interest may arise between the local and central governments and
thus cause discord among the policies each may advocate. Ding, supra note 42, at 347.
70 Wang, supra note 46, at 35.
(4

5 Id.
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benefit to the region provides little incentive to the local economy.7 1 These local
governments primarily fund their economies by heavily taxing the goods of other
regions, thus forcing local consumers to buy locally made products.7 2 "Local
governments acquiesce in, or support, the manufacture and sale of fake goods by local
enterprises." 73 Therefore, many local governments within China believe that
74
enforcing foreign IPRs would lead to local unemployment and instability.
Furthermore, the local enforcement officials report to the local politicians who
75
themselves are ultimately controlled by the will of the national government.
However, the national government does not possess the ability to sanction or dismiss
these local officials.7 6 Therefore, faced with implementing a directive from a higher
authority versus implementing a directive from the local politician, such as a mayor,
the officials are more likely to follow the interests of the local politicians. Such local
protectionism effectively undermines enforcement and creates widespread antipathy
for the central government's duty to enlarge the national economy.

B. Courts'LackofAuthority
As a subset of China's efforts to establish a basic legal system to protect IPRs,
China has also provided for the adjudication of issues related to the enforcement of
IPRs.7 7 Notwithstanding its existing courts, China established a specific trial
78
division in its industrialized regions to preside exclusively over IP issues.
However, there are several factors existing within the Chinese judiciary system
that permit continued infringement. China's courts are not entirely independent
from governmental administration.7 9
They serve, in part, to implement
governmental policy and still rely upon the national government for basic
resources. 8 0 Therefore, one way for an infringer to escape judicial enforcement is to
hide behind the guise of local protectionism discussed in the previous section.

Ding, supra note 42, at 348.
Wang, supra note 46, at 35.
73 Id
71
72

Ding, supra note 42, at 348.
75Daniel C. K. Chow, Counterfeiting i the People's Republic of China, 78 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 29
(2000).
7( Id. at 29.
74

77 Naigen Zhang, Intellectual PropertyLaw in China:Basic Policy and New Developments, 4
ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 14 (1997). The basic judicial setup of the Chinese People's Court has
4 tiers: District People's court, Intermediate People's Court, High People's Court, and Supreme
People's Court. Id.
7S Id. at 15. Specifically, in 1993, China created intellectual property law divisions in the High
People's Court and the Intermediate People's Court in the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin,
and in the Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu and Hainan Provinces, with the rationale that the
prevalence of IP lawsuits in these regions would benefit from a specialized court that could
adjudicate IP issues in a timely manner. Id.
7) David L. Weller, The BureaucraticHeavy Hand in China:Legal Means for Foreign Investors
to ChallengeAgencyAction, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1238, 1278 (1998). China's post-reform Constitution
does not embody the principle of separation of powers. Id. Chinese courts do have independence but
still serve a policy implementing function. Id.

8o ld.
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In addition, because each local government is allowed to retain a portion of
revenue from local businesses, local governments have an incentive to intervene in
judicial matters. 81 For example, local enterprises being sued for infringement could
fall into financial trouble or possibly go bankrupt, causing a decrease in revenue for
the local government. Thus, an incentive exists for local governments to interfere in
the judicial proceeding or with a court's judgment. 82 Additionally, the low salaries of
83
judges increase the possibility for bribery and corruption.
Additional factors add to the disparity of China's IP regime: (1) a lack of
knowledge regarding IPRs due to traditional thought within Chinese culture; 84 (2) a
lack of legal training of judges in IP issues 85 (however, recent efforts have been made
to improve judges' knowledge in the area of IPS6); and (3) a reluctance by the courts to
87
issue damages that would deter infringement.

VI. CHINESE LEGAL REFORM WILL CREATE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT

Upon noting the significant levels of infringement, one may suggest that China
lacks sufficient IP laws and mechanisms to provide for the protection of IPRs. This
speculation, however, is untrue. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
("USTR") has recognized that China has taken significant steps towards enacting
legislation and enforcement mechanisms. 8 8 James Lilley, former U.S. ambassador to
China, stated that "the problem [is] not in the Chinese laws, since [China has] very
tough IPR rules."89 Thus, the United States remains fixated on better enforcement of
China's existing laws.
Even though China continues its efforts to enforce its IP laws, the problems of
local protectionism and judicial shortcomings have not allowed those efforts to reach
fruition. In 2003, China was experiencing its highest rate of piracy since 1995.90
Because of such ongoing infringement, in May 2004, the USTR once again placed
81 Ding, supra note 42, at 348.
82

See id.

83 Eric

M. Griffin, Stop Relying on Uncle Sam! - A Proactive Approach to Copyright Protection

in the People's Republic of China, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 169, 184 (1998).
84 Id. at 186. Moreover, disseminating information as to the protection of intellectual property
rights throughout the country would be an enormous task. I-d. Therefore, individuals are likely
unaware that certain actions may constitute a violation of the IP laws. Id. Speculation from this
hypothetical could lead to the inference that a majority of infringers are "innocent." See id.
85 Id. at 185. IP is remains a relatively novel issue in Chinese courts and therefore, the lack of
experienced judges in this area makes it difficult to enforce IP laws effectively. Id.
86 Wang, supra note 46, at 26. Judges' qualifications do not rise to that of the lawyers'. Id. In
1995, China enacted the Law of Judge to help improve the quality of the judges' knowledge. Id.
87 Griffen, supra note 83, at 184. The methods Chinese courts use for calculating such
damages are based on the value of the infringing products in the pirated market, and not the
legitimate market. Id.
88Endeshaw, supra note 45, at 321. The series of China-U.S. agreements in 1979, 1992, 1995,
is proof that China has undertaken significant efforts to bring their IPR regime to comparative
international standards. Id. at 323.
89
Id. at 321.
90
Phuong Yokitis, MPAA Commends USTR 'Special 301' Report: China Under
'Section 306 Monitoring,' Taiwan, Russia and Brazil on 'Priority Watch List,' at 2,
http://www.mpaa.org/MPAAPress/2004/2004 05 03.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).

[4:608 2005]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

China on the USTR Special 306 Priority Monitoring List ("Special 306"), which
allows for the strategical protection of U.S. IPRs.' Special 306 imposes the threat of
sanctions if there is a decrease in China's enforcement of its bilateral agreement
regarding 1P.92 To reassure the United States that China would significantly reduce
IPR infringement, Chinese Vice Premier Wu delineated six objectives in the pursuit
of enforcement. 93 These objectives seek to strengthen IPR protection through (1)
judicial interpretation, (2) concentrated efforts to prevent piracy, (3) implementing
new customs regulations, (4) ratifying WIPO treaties protecting against Internet
piracy, (5)conducting audits to ensure the use of legitimate software and (6) public
94
education campaigns designed to convey the importance of IPRs.
Other measures U.S. companies are taking to protect their IPRs are through
cooperation with international organizations. 95 By using multinational industrybased organizations within China, these companies, in participation with such
organizations, could effectively lobby towards the protection of their industry specific
IPRs. 96 International organizations would also prove useful in other ways: (1)
educating consumers, retailers and governments; (2) monitoring the activities of
possible infringers; (3) providing a forum for negotiation; (4) pressuring local
97
governments; and (5) possibly initiating legislation.
These measures, along with the USTR objectives, are realistic goals that should
provide for more effective enforcement of IPRs. Such goals, however, are only the
minimal steps that should be taken. The fundamental problem of local protectionism
remains a significant underlying cause of IPR infringement.
98
The Chinese government must push further in the area of legal reform.
Eliminating local protectionism in China will not be simple because the foundation of
traditional Chinese economy stands as an impediment to emancipating the courts
from governmental interference. 99 A solution to the problems of local protectionism
and judicial dependency on local practices requires that the barriers of regionalism

91Office of the United States Trade Representative, Special 301 Report § 306,
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Reports-Publications/
2004/2004_Special_301/2004_Special301_ReportSection306.html (last visited Aug. 1,
2005) [hereinafter Special 306].
92 Yokitis, supra note 90, at 1.
9 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2004 Special 301 Report,
Executive
Summary,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/ReportsPublications/2004/ 2004_Special_301/asset-upload-file16_5995.pdf (last visited Aug. 1,
2005).
9 Id.
9"Griffen, supranote 83, at 190.

96Id.
97 Id.

98Inventors" Rights Protected, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 24, 2003, available at LEXIS, News &
Business, Major World Publications, Journal Code FCHD. Within the past two years, attempts have
been made to circumvent the problems of local protectionism. Id. Regional IPR administrations set
up several cross-province IPR enforcement agencies. Id. Although this may appear to solve the
problem of disproportionate enforcement of IPRs, it is analogous to using a band-aid for a broken
bone. The problem of local protectionism will persist and the regional officials will retain the power
to influence the local judges.
99See Wang, supra note 46, at 39. Political reform is the only way that China will be able to
create an independent legal authority. Id.
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be removed through legislation to create a national market and an independent
judicial system.
Local judges must be allowed to control their judicial power and abandon their
subordination to superior officials' directives. 100 This could be achieved through
legislation mandating that local judges be elected. If elected, local judges will be less
likely to feel obligated to implement the will of local politicians. Moreover, it is also
likely that judicial elections would provide for increased impartiality in court
proceedings. In addition, elections will provide the opportunity for individuals who
were not conditioned to the extreme loyalty of the "unified leadership of the Party" to
become judges. 10 1 Furthermore, judicial elections will create a divergence from a
merit-based system that promotes the judges' interest in advancing their superiors
10 2
directives which are contrary to IPR enforcement.
Ideally, China needs to reallocate powers within its government in order to
break down local protectionism and create a unified national market.10 3 In March of
2005, the Chinese legislature was scheduled to discuss a draft of an antitrust law
0 4
This would
aimed at breaking down the barriers that lead to local protectionism.
cause the local governments to comply completely with the national government's
directives relating to IP laws.
The national government should then take away the regional governments'
powers to influence decisions the courts make (i.e., local politicians' abilities to
remove judges). Judges would then be free to enforce the IP laws as they exist and
hand down fair judgments against infringers, rather than enforcing the politicians'
favoritism toward local protectionist policies that burden IPRs.
Local governments, however, might resist any such deprivation of power. The
localities would be directed to implement and enforce the IP laws at a cost to their
local economies, leading the local governments to retaliate by total refusal. Indeed,
this problem could be solved through government funding. The Chinese national
government should use financial incentives to back the implementation and
enforcement of IPRs in individual regions. As a result, local governments would no
longer have to rely upon anti-competitive practices to sustain their local economies.
Such reallocation of powers within China's governmental system, combined with
100 See id. Presently, judges are elected by the Local People's Congress or appointed by
Committee of the People's Congress and have no tenure or are subject to removal. Id.
101Id. Presently, one requisite for an individual to be eligible to become a judge is that he must
demonstrate a loyalty to "the Adherence of the Four Basic Principles [adherence to MarxismLeninism-Mao Zedong Thought, to the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the socialist road, and to
the leadership of the Party]." Id. Such a requirement generates government and political officials
who will continue to support the proliferation of local protectionism. Id.
102 Id.
Judges have the incentive to follow their superiors' directives in order to gain merit
from their superiors. Id. This also allows judges to be lenient with a judgment because the blame
will shift upon their superiors. Id. at 39.
10
3 See Shi Ting, BreakingDown the Barriers to Progress,S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 10,
2004, at 7, available at LEXIS, News & Business, Major World Publications. One attempt of such
progression was the submission of a draft law that prohibited local governments "from creating
regional trade blockades by restricting the flow of commodities and labor." Id. In the fall of 2004,
Beijing "sent a joint taskforce to 28 provinces and regions to inspect local government progress on
eliminating market protectionism." Id. The taskforce included "top-level officials from seven
ministerial departments" including: the Ministry of Commerce, the State Council's Legal Affairs
Office and the Ministry of Finance. Id.
104Id.
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government subsidies, would establish an independent judicial authority and abolish
the need for local protectionism.
An even more ground-breaking change would be the implementation of a
federalist-like allocation of power within China. However, China's progression
toward a market-based economy foreshadows this event. 10 5 The ever-growing
population in China is becoming more receptive to private-rather than publicownership. It follows that as these Chinese push toward economic development,
Chinese officials will be presented with a widespread sentiment to further reform
Chinese policy and politics, 10 6 allowing for better enforcement of China's IP laws.

VII. CONCLUSION
The infringement of IPRs in China is the most contentious issue involving
China's trade relations in the global economy. The infringement epidemic that China
is experiencing is a result of implementing the gambit of international IPR treaties
into their domestic agenda. Most notably, the historical repression of protecting
one's creative works under China's communist economy created the influx of
infringement once China began to shift towards a market economy in 1979.
China's endeavors to create an environment that is friendly to foreign
investment, along with the United States's efforts to protect its IPR within China
through bilateral trade agreements, resulted in China's promulgation of a
comprehensive system of IP laws. However, rampant infringement continues in
China due to judicial inconsistencies caused mainly by local protectionism. This has
created a severe lack of IPR enforcement within China. However, if China would
reallocate the balance of power within its government to create an independent legal
authority and provide incentives for local enforcement of IPRs, China could make
huge advancements in preventing the problem of excessive piracy.

105 See Wang, supra note 46, at 39.
106 South Korea and Taiwan experienced similar political reforms. _Id. These governments had
policies similar to that of China (influenced by Confucianism). Id. Over the span of about thirty
years their governments sustained increased economic development in commerce and industry, and
ultimately experienced a political and economic change. Id.; see alsoYokitis, supra note 90, at 2.

